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Introduction 
The challenge of designing institutions to manage ethno-national conflict is a long-running 
topic of academic inquiry and dispute (see Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985; McGarry & 
O’Leary 2007). Generally speaking, the focus is on how legislatures, executives and electoral 
systems can be organized to accommodate the politics of deeply divided societies (Choudhry 
2008).  The design of courts figures much less frequently in this literature (for some 
exceptions, see Choudhry & Stacey 2012; Horowitz 2006; Issacharoff 2015; and McCrudden 
& O’Leary 2013).  But courts, particularly constitutional courts, may play a vital role in such 
contexts. Although inter-group trust is likely to be fragile in the wake of conflict, courts may 
help to make constitutional commitments to group autonomy and the protection of minority 
rights more credible than they might otherwise be (see Lake & Rothchild 1996; and North & 
Weingast 1989). Furthermore, any constitutional settlement of any complexity will inevitably 
generate disputes about the meaning and implication of its terms. Where disagreement cannot 
be resolved politically, a constitutional court offers a potential focal point to coordinate a 
solution and, hopefully, avoid constitutional collapse (see Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton 
2009:107-8; and Ginsburg 2012:725).  Both of these functions require the court to be, or at 
least appear to be, sufficiently impartial and independent with respect to rival ethno-political 
factions.   
Although judicial impartiality and independence are often conflated (see Karlan 1999; 
and Tiede 2006), the two can be usefully distinguished. We can define “judicial impartiality” 
as the extent to which judges are unmoved by prejudices or ideological biases that might 
incline them to decide a dispute one way or the other. In contrast, “judicial independence” 
can be defined as the extent to which judges are insulated from threats and incentives that 
might motivate them to decide a dispute one way or the other (regardless of the legal merits 
and their own sincere preferences).  Each of these qualities is associated with a distinct aspect 
of court design. As Brinks and Blass (2016) explain, the design of courts varies with respect 
to what they call “ex ante autonomy” and “ex post autonomy”.  The former concerns the 
scope for political actors to influence the political biases of the court through the appointment 
of “ideological allies” (Brinks & Blass 2013: 5) and therefore affects judicial impartiality.  
The latter concerns the extent to which political or other external actors can pressure judges 
to decide a case one way or the other and therefore goes to judicial independence.   
Neither the impartiality nor the independence of constitutional courts can be taken for 
granted.  Even in relatively homogenous democracies, constitutional courts are often seen to 
be highly politicised in terms of their appointment processes, decision-making, and the kinds 
of cases they hear (Garoupa, Gomez-Pomar, & Grembi 2013; Amaral-Garcia, Garoupa, & 
Grembi 2009; and Hönnige 2009). But courts in deeply divided polities face special dangers 
and challenges, particularly in the wake of conflict where the rule of law is weak (Haggard & 
Tiede 2014). Minorities may worry that the court will be indefinitely captured by the majority 
and, consequently, have little or no confidence in the court’s ability to protect their rights and 
interests (Sadurski 2014: 304-328). Furthermore, assuming that dissenting opinions are made 
public, conspicuous ethnic or ethno-national divisions within the court may undermine its 
image as a neutral arbiter of constitutional dispute (Garoupa & Ginsburg 2011). Thus, to the 
extent that it might affect judicial impartiality and independence, the design of a 
constitutional court in a deeply divided society may be nearly as important to the success of a 
constitutional settlement as the substance of the settlement itself. Indeed, the conventional 
wisdom, in both academic and policy circles, is that the design of courts does make a 
difference.  Merit-based selection systems are favoured over party-political appointment 
processes on the grounds that they are more likely to select better qualified and more 
impartial judges (see Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009; Volcansek 2007; and Reddick 2001). Life 
or long-term tenure is thought to enhance judicial independence by insulating judges from 
careerist pressures and incentives to placate political elites (see La Porta et al. 2004; Jackson 
2007). These suppositions have recently been subjected to some rigorous comparative 
research (Hayo & Voigt 2007; and Melton & Ginsburg 2014),1 but the challenge of achieving 
judicial impartiality and independence in ethnically or ethno-nationally divided polities 
remains virtually uncharted research territory.  
With reference to the experience of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
we investigate the relationship between ethno-national affiliation and judicial behaviour and 
                                                          
1 As we discuss below, the results of this research are mixed with respect to how and to what 
extent the design of courts affects judicial behaviour.    
the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that relationship. 2 The 
Bosnian Constitutional Court is a particularly interesting case-study for several reasons.  
Firstly, it provides a window into the challenges facing recently empowered courts in 
transitional and post-conflict settings. The study of courts in contexts where the rule of law is 
relatively tenuous may help illuminate the factors that determine how and why some courts 
become “consequential” while others remain marginal or ineffectual (see Epstein et al 2001; 
and Kapiszewksi et al 2013). Second, the case of a court in an ethno-nationally divided 
society provides an opportunity to see if and how the “attitudinal model” of judicial 
behaviour (which has been so influential in the study of courts in the United States) can be 
extended to contexts where the more familiar left-right ideological spectrum is usually 
overshadowed by other kinds of politics.  Such efforts are vital if we are to move beyond 
well-worn theoretical frameworks that have relied, perhaps too heavily, on courts in the 
United States for their inspiration (see Hirschl 2014: ch 5). Finally, the record of the Bosnian 
                                                          
2 Our approach assumes, as countless other studies do, that quantitative analysis allows for 
valid causal inference about the factors that affect judicial behaviour. However, we recognise 
that some would argue that ethno-national background, in so far as it is an immutable 
personal characteristic akin to race or sex, cannot be treated as a true causal variable because 
it cannot be conceptualised as a “treatment”, i.e. a property that is, at least hypothetically, 
amenable to “manipulation” (see Boyd et al 2010; Greiner and Rubin 2011). This 
interpretation of causal inference is not accepted by everyone (see Sen & Wasow 2014; and 
Marcellesi 2013).  We are agnostic about the right way to conceptualise variables of this kind 
but, for the sake of convenience, the discussion that follows sometimes refers to the 
“influence” or “effect” of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour.  The reader may 
elect to interpret such statements as propositions about “relationships” between variables (as 
opposed to true “causal effects”).   
Constitutional Court is particularly fertile ground for investigating the effects of court design.  
In the absence of “mid-stream” changes to the basic institutional makeup of courts, studies 
that seek to test hypotheses about the effects of court design rely on cross-national or cross-
jurisdictional comparisons for variance (Brace & Hall 1997: 1210). In contrast, the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court allows for a kind of within-country natural experiment. Although the 
Court has always been composed of an equal number of politically appointed judges from 
each of the three main communities (two Bosniaks, two Serbs, and two Croats), the first set 
of judges were appointed for five-year non-renewable mandates while judges appointed 
thereafter enjoy long-term tenure (with mandatory retirement at age seventy).  We aim to 
leverage this “mid-stream” institutional change to estimate the effects of judicial tenure on 
judicial behaviour.  
Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the non-unanimous abstract 
review decisions of the Constitutional Court, we find that judges on the Constitutional Court 
do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines and that these divisions cannot be 
reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical 
expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does not dampen the influence of ethno-
national affiliation on judicial behaviour.  Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a 
judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-
making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and 
tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.     
 
Background on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Constitutional Court  
In 1995, representatives of the belligerent parties to the Bosnian war concluded the so-called 
“Dayton Agreement”, ending a conflict that had already claimed about 100,000 lives.  Annex 
4 to the Dayton Agreement included a new constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, prescribing 
a complex mix of power-sharing and territorial decentralization as a compromise between the 
Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) goal of a unitary sovereign state and the Croat and Serb objectives 
of separate/irredentist breakaway republics (Keil 2014; Bieber 2006). Pursuant to the 
Agreement, the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two sub-
state entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (“FBiH”), which is mostly Bosniak and 
partially Croat and is itself divided into ten cantons, and the Serb-dominated Republika 
Srpska (hereafter “RS”).3 
Alongside territorial decentralization, the Constitution fragments power within the 
central state-level (hereafter “BiH”) institutions, requiring power-sharing between the three 
“constituent peoples”.4 The executive is to be led by a three person presidency with positions 
allocated along ethno-national lines, i.e. one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat.5 The Bosniak 
and Croat members of the Presidency are elected by voters registered to vote in the FBiH 
who may vote for either the Bosniak or Croat member of the Presidency but not for both, 
while the Serb member of the Presidency is directly elected by voters registered to vote in 
RS. Executive power is parcelled out among a Council of Ministers, 1/3 of which must be 
                                                          
3 Following an arbitration process to settle a territorial dispute that was not yet resolved at the 
time of the Agreement, a distinct administrative district, Brčko, was later formed and initially 
administered by the international community.  Although Brčko is formally part of both sub-
state entities, it is now administered by its own municipal government and subject to the laws 
of the central state.    
4 The phrase “constituent people” is introduced in the Constitution’s preamble and used 
throughout the Constitution to refer to Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.   
5 Art. V. 
appointed from the territory of RS.6 These power-sharing mechanisms are complemented by 
a set of mutual veto powers (Bahtić-Kunrath, 2011).7  All of this is overseen by the peculiar 
institution of the Office of the High Representative, effectively an extension of the 
“international community” empowered to supervise and support the implementation and 
maintenance of the Dayton Agreement (see Belloni 2008; and Caplan: 2004).8  
To uphold the legal dimensions of these arrangements, the Constitution establishes an 
apex court: the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 The Constitutional Court 
[hereafter “the Court”] is a variation on the “Kelsenian” model common throughout much of 
continental Europe (Stone 1990). Consistent with that model, the Court has exclusive 
“abstract review” jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the Constitution “between the 
Entities or between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between institutions 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.10 Such disputes may only be referred to the Court by “a member 
                                                          
6 Art. V, 4(b); Art. 4, 3(e).   
7 Art. 5, 2(d). There effectively two veto powers: (1) the “vital national interest” veto, which 
may be activated either by a member of the Presidency or a majority of the ethnic caucus in 
the House of Peoples; and (2) the so-called “entity veto”, whereby all decisions in both 
houses require support of at least one-third of the delegates elected from each sub-state entity. 
8 Although the Office of the High Representative has played a somewhat less interventionist 
role in Bosnian politics in recent years, the country has yet to meet the conditions required for 
phasing the institution out. 
9 Art. VI. The Court is technically a reconstituted version of the original sub-national 
Constitutional Court of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (a constituent 
republic of what was Yugoslavia).  
10 Art. VI 3(a).   
of the Presidency, by the Chair of the Council of Ministers, by the Chair or a Deputy Chair of 
either chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, by one-fourth of the members of either 
chamber of the Parliamentary Assembly, or by one-fourth of either chamber of a legislature 
of an Entity”.11 Provided that the petitioner falls within one of these categories, the Court has 
no discretion to refuse to hear an abstract review challenge.  In addition, the Court has 
appellate jurisdiction “over issues under this Constitution arising out of a judgment of any 
other court in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.12  Lower courts may also refer a law to the 
Constitutional Court where its decision depends on the law’s validity.13 Finally, in 
exceptional cases, the Court has jurisdiction to review the use of the so-called “vital national 
interest” veto where legislative deadlock cannot otherwise be resolved.14 
The constitutional provisions governing the appointment of judges to the 
Constitutional Court reflect the system of ethno-territorial power-sharing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: four judges are appointed by the legislature of the FBiH entity and two by the 
legislature of the RS entity.15 In addition to these “domestic” judges, the Constitution also 
provides for the inclusion of three “international” judges, ostensibly as an impartial ballast, to 
be appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights in consultation with 
                                                          
11 Ibid.  
12 Art. VI 3(b).  In practice, the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is much broader than might be 
supposed because the right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, protected under Art. 
3(e), may be engaged by virtually any legal proceeding where it is alleged that an error was 
made by a lower court.     
13 Art. VI 3(c).    
14 Art. IV 3(f). 
15 Art. VI 1(a).   
the Presidency of BiH.16 These judges cannot be from Bosnia-Herzegovina or from any of its 
neighbouring countries.17 The only limit imposed by the Constitution on the selection of the 
domestic judges is the somewhat vague criterion that they be “distinguished jurists of high 
moral standing”.18  Hence, the judges come to the Court with varied professional 
backgrounds and experience (see the ‘Appendix’).19   Eight of the eighteen domestic judges 
who have sat on the Court were previously judges on lower courts and/or entity-level 
constitutional courts. Five of those eighteen were previously legal academics, holding 
positions at law schools in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, or Mostar.  Seven held some kind of 
government job or elected political office prior to being appointed to the Constitutional 
Court.  All of the domestic judges are either graduates of Bosnian law schools (i.e. Banja 
Luka, Mostar, or Sarajevo) or law schools in the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Belgrade or Novi 
Sad).  There are clear ethno-territorial patterns in these various backgrounds.  Of those judges 
with prior judicial experience, Bosniak and Croat judges served on courts in FBiH (or what is 
now FBiH) while the Serb judges served on courts in RS (or what is now RS).  Similarly, of 
those judges with prior political or government experience, Bosniaks and Croats occupied 
such roles within FBiH entity (or what is now FBiH), while the Serbs had roles within RS (or 
what is now RS). The judges’ legal education also appears to follow an ethno-territorial 
pattern: most of the Bosniak or Croat judges went to law school in what is now FBiH, while 
all of the Serb judges trained in what is now either the RS entity or Serbia. 
Although there is no legal requirement that the domestic judges be of any particular 
                                                          
16 Art. VI 1(a). 
17 Art. VI 1(b).   
18 Art. VI 1(b). 
19 Our biographical data on the judges is taken from the Court's public records. 
 
ethno-national background, the convention is that the four judges appointed by the FBiH 
entity legislature will always include two Bosniaks and two Croats and the two judges 
appointed by the Serb entity legislature will be Serbs.  By all accounts, the appointment of 
these judges is closely orchestrated by the political parties (Radić-Dragić 2014).  When a 
vacancy in one of the domestic posts arises, a commission for selection and appointment is 
constituted within the relevant legislature to invite and review applications and compile a list 
of candidates. This list is then presented to the legislature to elect the requisite number of 
judges by secret ballot. At the FBiH entity legislature, the process is subject to a kind of elite 
pact; the dominant Bosniak and Croat parties separately determine which of “their” 
respective judges will be nominated and ultimately appointed. At the RS entity legislature, 
the process is simpler – appointments are controlled by the dominant party (which has always 
been a Serb nationalist party).  
Despite the political nature of the appointment process, the Court enjoys a good deal 
of formal “ex post autonomy”.  Once appointed, the judges may only be removed “for cause 
by consensus of the other judges”.20  Otherwise, as was mentioned earlier, the first set of 
                                                          
20 Art. VI 1(c). This power has only been used once, in 2010, after leaked correspondence 
between Judge Krstan Simić and Serb politicians seemed to show the existence of on-going 
ties (and even active collusion) between Simić and SNSD. The Court acted quickly to oust 
Simić, justifying his removal on the grounds that he had been “deliberately undermining the 
reputation and dignity of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and dignity of a 
judge” (see the Court’s decision at 
http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/Decision_on_Dismissal.pdf). It should also be noted that, 
despite questionable constitutional authority, the High Representative once acted to block the 
appointment of two Serb judges (see “Decision annulling the appointment of two Judges 
from the RS to the BiH Constitutional Court”, 16 September 2002). 
judges held short-term mandates of five years while all judges thereafter are appointed for 
long-term mandates with mandatory retirement at age seventy.21  Furthermore, the Court has 
complete control over its own internal rules and procedures, which are neither prescribed by 
the Constitution nor defined by legislation,22  and it is also responsible for drafting its own 
budget (to be allocated from a central state fund).23  
In addition to the formal independence enjoyed by the Court, the fragmented and 
decentralized political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina (with its several veto points) makes it 
difficult for domestic political actors to coordinate and launch a direct attack against it 
(Ferejohn 2002; Tsebelis 2002).  Consequently, the Court is comparatively insulated from 
overt “court curbing”.24   Indeed, contrary to the expectation that constitutional courts in new 
                                                          
21 Art. VI 1(c). We have not been able to conclusively determine the original rationale for this 
two-phased tenure system, but it is said to have been a compromise between the preferences 
of the Dayton Agreement’s negotiators.  
22 See Article VI.3(a), which empowers the Court to adopt its own rules.  
23Art. III, Rules of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazette of 
BiH no. 22/14). The Court defended its financial independence in Case U 6/06 (29 March 
2008). The Court invalidated a national law that sought to reduce the salaries of the judiciary, 
reasoning that the Constitution requires that the Court itself control the plan and allocation of 
its own budget.  
24 It should be noted, however, that the High Representative’s extraordinary powers to 
legislate by decree have been used on one occasion to effectively overrule a decision of the 
Court (see Everly: 2008).  The relationship between the Office of the High Representative 
and the Court is a fascinating topic in its own right but it is also one that is beyond the scope 
of the discussion here.   
democracies will be relatively timid and underutilized (Ginsburg 2004), the Court was 
quickly drawn into the political fray and asserted itself as a powerful and important player in 
several early landmark cases.25 The best example of this confidence is Case U-5/98 (often 
called “The Decision on the Constituency of Peoples”), where the Court invalidated sections 
of both entity constitutions.  The case arose from an abstract review challenge brought by 
Alija Izetbegović, then the Bosniak member of the BiH state-level Presidency. The main 
thrust of the challenge concerned several provisions of the entity constitutions which, in the 
case of RS, seemed to reflect a mono-national and distinctly Serb-centric conception of the 
sub-state entity, or, in the case of the FBiH entity, granted special recognition and rights to 
Bosniaks and Croats but failed to include Serbs on equal footing. Although nothing in the 
substantive body of the Constitution explicitly prohibited any of this, the petitioner argued 
that the challenged provisions of the entity constitutions contravened an overarching 
constitutional principle, referenced in the Constitution’s Preamble, guaranteeing the 
collective equality of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, as “constituent peoples”. The majority of 
the Court agreed with the core of this argument and invalidated several of the challenged 
provisions in both entity constitutions.   
The majority’s decision was bold for two reasons.  First of all, it favoured an abstract 
teleological theory of the Constitution, only vaguely supported by the language of the 
Preamble, against the more concrete historical claim (favoured by the dissent) that the sub-
                                                          
25 In its first few years, the Court was called on to decide controversies of profound 
constitutional significance: the constitutionality of the Dayton Agreement itself (Case U-
7/97); changes to the organization of the Council of Ministers (Case U-1/99); the amenability 
of the High Representative’s decisions to judicial review (Case U-9/00); and, perhaps most 
controversially of all, the compatibility of provisions of the entity constitutions with the 
constitutional principle of the “equality of constituent peoples” (Case U-5/98). 
state entities were deliberately designed as bases for the self-government of different 
constituent peoples (see Marko 2005: 10-11; and  Kulenović 2016).  Second, overruling 
important sections of the entity constitutions would inevitably generate disagreement and 
uncertainty about the amendments needed to implement the Court’s decision.  As it 
happened, no agreement among the political parties on the requisite amendments was 
forthcoming and so a range of changes were ultimately imposed by the Office of the High 
Representative in 2002, expanding power-sharing to all levels of government and requiring 
that all three constituent peoples within both entities be accorded the same status and rights 
(Bieber 2006:121-33).  
 Case U-5/98 is a complicated and difficult read, particularly because it is divided into 
several “partial decisions”. Nevertheless, one blunt fact is apparent: the Court divided along 
clear ethno-national lines: a majority bloc of Bosniak judges and International judges lined up 
against a vociferous dissenting bloc of Serb and Croat judges to invalidate sections of both 
the FBiH and RS constitutions. Split decisions such as this are not likely to escape notice in a 
deeply divided society. Indeed, although it may have helped assuage fears that the Court 
would be captured by one community to the detriment of the others, the practice of including 
a set number of judges from each constituent people also serves to draw attention to the 
ethno-national affiliation of the judges, inviting accusations of political bias in non-
unanimous and politically sensitive cases. Such accusations extend beyond the national 
judges (who are simply presumed to favour their putative communal interests) to the 
international judges as well, who are thought to favour the interests of the “international 
community” (Feldman 2011: 219).  Indeed, academic commentary, although less vitriolic in 
tone, concurs with the general impression that the Court is, or at least has been, prone to 
ethno-nationally driven decision-making patterns (McCrudden & O’Leary 2013: ch. 6). 
The most recent case to highlight this problem is the Court’s decision in Case U 3/13 
(November 2015), where a 5-4 majority of Bosniak and international judges ruled that a law 
establishing the 9th of January as a public holiday in the RS entity was unconstitutional.  The 
9th of January is significant because it marks the day in 1992 when Bosnian Serbs 
proclaimed the “independence” of Republika Srpska, in addition to being the day when 
Eastern Orthodox Serbs celebrate St. Stephen’s Day. For this reason, the majority in U 3/13 
concluded that the law unconstitutionally discriminated against non-Serbs.  Prior to the 
decision, the RS legislature had issued a pre-emptive declaration stating that it would not 
obey the Court if it invalidated the law on public holidays (see EU Delegation to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Flash Report, 10 April 2015).  It is no great surprise then that Bosnian Serb 
politicians have since refused to implement the Court’s ruling and condemned the Bosniak 
judges for imposing their political preferences “with the help of foreign judges”.26 Milorad 
Dodik, the President of the RS entity, went so far as to call the Court “nothing but a Muslim 
court against Serbs”.27  At the time of writing, the main Bosnian Serb parties are threatening to 
blockade central institutions unless a new law is passed to remove international judges from 
the Court and prevent the possibility of one community’s judges outvoting the other two 
communities’ judges in split decisions. Beyond this recent controversy, the Court has had 
compliance problems with many of its decisions (EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Flash Report, 23 April 2015; see also Banovic et al 2014).   
 
Theory and Hypotheses  
                                                          
26 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/sds-proposing-changes-to-bosnian-constitutional-
court-12-08-2015-1. 
27 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-defy-bosnian-constitutional-court-
over-serb-national-day-ruling-11-27-2015. 
The Influence of Ethno-National Affiliation on Judicial Behaviour  
The impression that the Constitutional Court divides along ethno-national lines is consistent 
with what one might expect in society such as Bosnia-Herzegovina.  One of the characteristic 
traits of deeply divided societies is the tendency for the salient cleavages to infuse almost 
every aspect of social and political life. Elections proceed “like a census”, with parties 
mobilizing on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Moore 2001: 89).  Residence, education, media, 
and economic opportunity structures also tend to be fragmented along the same lines. In 
short, as Donald Horowitz puts it, “[i]n divided societies, ethnic affiliations are powerful, 
permeative, passionate, and pervasive” (1985: 12).  Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly fits this 
pattern. All of the major political parties draw on a virtually mono-ethnic electoral base.  
Even the ostensibly non-nationalist and multi-ethnic Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH 
(“SDP”) relies on an overwhelmingly Bosniak vote.  Moreover, with the sole exception of the 
SDP, all of the major parties are overtly nationalist in their orientation and, for most of the 
post-war period, relatively hard-line nationalist parties have held the reins of power at both 
central and entity levels. Even the once ostensibly “moderate” Serb nationalist party, Savez 
nezavisnih (“SNSD”) openly threaten secession and frequently contest the legitimacy of the 
central state institutions. In addition, as a result of massive population displacement during 
the war, the country is divided into mostly ethnically homogenous zones; mixed 
municipalities (such as Sarajevo, Mostar, or Brčko) are the exception (Bieber 2006:29-33). 
Predictably, education is also mostly mono-ethnic; even in mixed areas, separate Croat and 
Bosniak schools teaching different curricula sometimes operate under the same roof 
(Swimelar 2013).28 Likewise, media is ethnically differentiated, with Bosniaks oriented 
                                                          
28Recently, the FBiH Supreme Court ruled that this “two schools, one roof” practice was 
discriminatory (see Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH, Judgment 58 0 Ps 085653 13 
Rev [29.08.2014]). 
towards Sarajevo-based outlets, Croats looking to media from Croatia, and Serbs consuming 
media from RS or Serbia (Jusic & Ahmetašević 2013). Finally, and partly as a result of 
geographic segregation, economic status is ethnically stratified, with Croats being generally 
more affluent than Bosniaks and Serbs (Bieber 2006: 33-39).  
 Given the pervasive salience of ethno-national divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there 
at least two theoretical reasons to expect ethno-national affiliation to influence judicial 
behaviour on the Court.   Firstly, this is what a broad reading of the “attitudinal model” of 
judicial behaviour would predict.  Proponents of the attitudinal model, pioneered to explain 
judicial decision-making on the United States Supreme Court, typically look at how 
individual judges’ votes tend to fall along a left-right ideological spectrum (Segal & Spaeth 
2002).  But there is no reason why the basic idea of the attitudinal model – that judges are 
influenced by their political preferences – cannot be extended to other kinds of politics (see 
Ostberg & Wetstein 2007).   If judges do decide many cases according to their political 
preferences, and those preferences are structured by ethno-national affiliation, then we should 
expect judicial behaviour to reflect differences in ethno-national affiliation.  In the case of the 
Bosnian Constitutional Court, this expectation is buttressed by the fact that the appointment 
process is dominated by ethno-nationalist political parties who, in seeking to advance their 
political goals, can appoint judges’ whose ethno-national politics mirror their own.   
A second reason to expect ethno-national affiliation to influence judicial behaviour is 
simple in-group favouritism. Social psychologists have found considerable evidence that 
people tend to favour members of their own group, even where the relevant group categories 
are not otherwise socially salient and even when those categories are only temporarily 
ascribed to subjects for the purposes of experimental research (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel et al 1971).  
Not surprisingly, group biases of this kind seem to be especially acute where the relevant 
group categories are politicised and/or out-group members are perceived to be a threat of 
some kind (see Cairns et al 2006; and Tajfel & Turner 1979) Apparently, judicial behaviour 
is not immune to this phenomenon.  A line of research from the United States has found 
evidence of ethnic biases in the criminal justice system there (see for example Abrams et al 
2012; and Glaeser & Sacerdote 2003) and recent studies from Israel find evidence of ethnic 
bias in both bail hearings (Gazal‐Ayal & Sulitzeanu‐Kenan 2010) and small claims awards 
(Shayo & Zussman 2010).  It seems plausible then that judicial decision-making in a deeply 
divided society such as Bosnia-Hercegovina would be prone to similar group biases.   
In light of the above considerations, we propose to test the following hypothesis 
against the judges’ voting records in non-unanimous abstract review cases:  
 
CO-ETHNIC PETITIONER HYPOTHESIS:  
The domestic judges will be more likely (all else equal) to find a constitutional violation 
where the challenge is brought by a co-ethnic petitioner.   
It should be noted that evidence in support of this hypothesis would be consistent with either 
ethno-national attitudinal bias and/or in-group favouritism.  Unfortunately, as we explain 
later, our data and research design do not allow us to distinguish between the observable 
implications of these two putative causes.  However, given the political and social salience of 
ethno-national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would expect some combination of both.    
 
The Effects of Tenure  
 
Some commentators have speculated that the Court appears to be less ethno-nationally 
divided since the introduction of long-term tenure in 2003, possibly signaling “an era in 
which loyalty to entities or peoples is subordinated to legal professionalism and loyalty to the 
Constitution and the Court” (Feldman 2005: 660; see also Choudhry & Stacey 2011). Indeed, 
although dissent rates have varied widely across both mandates, the overall rate of non-
unanimous decisions during the long-term mandates is considerably lower; 17.2% of plenary 
decisions during the Court’s long-term mandate (up to the end of 2013) were accompanied by 
at least one dissent, whereas 25.3% of decisions during the first 5-year mandate were non-
unanimous. That being said, the Court’s caseload increased substantially after it assumed 
jurisdiction over human rights challenges from the now defunct Human Rights Chamber in 
2003.29 Thus, the higher rate of unanimous decisions in the latter period may simply reflect a 
greater degree of “dissent aversion” – these judges are busier and so they may be less inclined 
to bother with writing dissenting opinions (see Epstein et al 2013: ch. 6).    
Still, there are some general reasons to expect that long-term tenure might make a 
difference for patterns of judicial behaviour. As was noted earlier, the conventional wisdom 
is that life or long-term tenure are critical safeguards against undue political influence and 
interference. The Federalist Papers, for example, describe life tenure as the most important 
guarantee of the “independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful 
performance of so arduous a duty” (Hamilton 2009: 395). In a similar vein, contemporary 
                                                          
29 The Human Rights Chamber was established under the terms of the Dayton Agreement as 
a parallel but temporary court for hearing human rights complaints in the aftermath of the 
war.  The Chamber consisted of six national judges (appointed in the same way as judges of 
the constitutional court and adhering to the convention of parity as between constituent 
peoples) and eight international judges appointed by the Council of Europe. The Chamber’s 
mandate expired in 2003, at which point a considerable backlog of pending cases was 
transferred to a temporary Human Rights Commission operating within the Constitutional 
Court. As we explain later, we do not consider these cases here because the ethnicity of the 
claimants cannot reliably be coded.    
governments and international organizations also cite long-term and life tenure as best 
practice.  The International Bar Association’s “New Delhi Standards” for judicial 
independence (1982: para. 22) state that “[j]udicial appointments should generally be for life, 
subject to removal for cause and compulsory retirement at an age fixed by law at the date of 
appointment” and that “[the institution of temporary judges should be avoided as far as 
possible long except where there exists a historic democratic tradition”. Likewise, the US 
Agency for International Development’s “Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and 
Impartiality” endorses life and long-term tenure as preferable to short-term appointments 
(2002). Many academic treatments of judicial independence concur with this conventional 
wisdom.  La Porta et al, for example, treat long-term tenure as the core of judicial 
independence, reasoning that judges with life-tenure “are both less susceptible to direct 
political pressure and less likely to have been selected by the government currently in office” 
(2004: 453). In contrast, short-term renewable tenure is typically thought to be the worst 
arrangement for judicial independence because it creates obvious re-appointment pressures 
that may influence judicial decision-making (Salzberger & Voigt 2002: 38; Sadurski 2014: 
27).  Between these two poles are non-renewable terms. Judges with non-renewable terms do 
not face reappointment pressures, but they may nevertheless (depending on the length of their 
mandate) feel pressured to placate powerful elites for the sake of later career opportunities 
(Sadusrki 2014: 28).30     
                                                          
30 Some might be tempted to view non-renewable tenure as functionally equivalent to life-
tenure – after all, judges under either arrangement have no need to worry about 
reappointment.  We disagree. As Wojciech Sadurski explains, “judges who come to the end 
of their term… and yet are well before retirement age can be quite conscious of the fact that 
their future may be shaped by politicians, and this may contribute to their political 
dependence” (2014: 28).   
The empirical evidence on the effects of judicial tenure is by no means conclusive.   
Studies of state courts in the United States, where there is considerable variance in judicial 
tenure, suggest that judges who face reappointment pressures - in the form of political 
reappointment, contested elections, or uncontested retention elections - do behave differently.  
Brace and Hall (1997) find that otherwise liberal judges who face re-election or 
reappointment, and especially those with relatively short mandates, are significantly more 
likely to impose the death penalty (se also Canes-Wrone et al 2014).  In a similar vein, 
Shepherd (2009) finds that judges on state supreme courts who face re-election or 
reappointment are more likely to decide cases in ways that favour the political preferences of 
their re-appointers.  The cross-national comparative evidence, however, is less definitive (see 
Hayo & Voigt 2007; Smithey & Ishiyama 2002; Herron & Randazzo 2003; Helmke & 
Rosenbluth 2009).  In a recent cross-national study, Melton and Ginsburg (2014) find that 
long-term tenure does enhance independent decision-making, but only in tandem with 
apolitical selection systems and only in authoritarian or transitional democracies. There is 
also at least some evidence to suggest that relatively short-term appointments do not 
necessarily inhibit judicial independence (see Chandrachud 2013). The Constitutional Court 
of Colombia, for example, is noted for taking assertive stands against government, despite the 
fact that the judges serve non-renewable terms of only eight years (Landau 2010; Schor 
2009).  In sum, our understanding of when and how judicial tenure matters across different 
courts and in different contexts is still in the relatively early stages of development.     
With respect to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether or not we 
should expect differences in tenure to actually moderate the influence of ethno-national 
affiliation on judicial behaviour surely depends, at least in part, on how we model the 
underlying cause of that influence. According to both the attitudinal and in-group favouritism 
models outlined above, tenure should make no significant difference because the influence of 
ethno-national affiliation is sincere and stems from a lack of impartiality (as opposed to 
independence).   But a strategic model of judicial behaviour might attribute a tendency to side 
with co-ethnic petitioners to the influence of sanctions and rewards deployed by political 
elites (Epstein & Jacobi 2010): if judges with shorter mandates lack independence relative to 
long-term appointed judges, they will be relatively more prone to curry the favour of political 
elites in the hope of gaining post-appointment advantages; and if the relationship between 
judges and political elites follows the usual pattern of communal “pillarization” associated 
with deeply divided polities, we should expect this dynamic to play out primarily within each 
communal pillar (Luther: 1999).31  In other words, political elites will reward co-ethnic 
judges for friendly decisions and, consequently, shorter term judges will be relatively more 
inclined to favour the preferences of co-ethnic elites. In this model, tenure should make a 
significant difference because the influence of ethno-national affiliation is (at least in part) 
strategic and reflects a lack of independence (as opposed to impartiality).  The plausibility of 
this conjecture in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina is strengthened by the fact that at least 
two judges from the Constitutional Court’s first mandate did actually go on to hold 
government or public sector jobs of some kind after their terms expired.  Accordingly, we 
propose to test the following hypothesis:  
 
THE SHORT-TERM TENURE HYPOTHESIS 
Any propensity to favour co-ethnic petitioners will be more pronounced in the behaviour of 
judges with five-year terms than in those judges who enjoy long-term tenure.  
 
                                                          
31 “Pillarization” here refers to creation and maintenance of parallel networks and 
organizational structures that tightly correspond to the salient communal divisions.  
But there is another, less categorical, way to think about the effects of tenure.  The simple 
attitudinal model we sketched above presumes that the judges’ political preferences are 
effectively static and constantly revealed across time (Spaeth 1979: 119-20).  In other words, 
an ethno-nationalist judge will remain an ethno-nationalist and consistently tend to decide 
cases in accordance with her ethno-nationalist preferences.  These assumptions may not be 
valid.  Several studies of judicial behaviour in the United States have noted the phenomenon 
of “ideological drift” – some initially conservative or liberal judges appear to become more or 
less so over time (see e.g. Epstein et al 2007).  Other studies suggest general “acclimation 
effects”, finding that the ideological aspect of judicial decision-making is relatively less 
predictable early in a judge’s tenure but tends to settle into more a predictable disposition 
after the judge “acclimates” to her role on the court (Boyea 2010; Collins 2008; Kaheny et al 
2008; Hagle 1993; Hettinger et al 2003; Hurwitz and Stefko: 2004; Wood et al 1998).  
Hurwitz and Stefko (2004), for example, find that attitudinal influences “progressively 
dominate” decision-making at the US Supreme Court - the justices become increasingly 
likely over the course of their tenure to depart from precedent in ways that track political 
ideology, an effect that the authors attribute to the justices gradually adjusting to the power 
they wield on a relatively unconstrained apex court (128).  As we explained above, the 
Bosnian Constitutional Court is also a relatively unconstrained apex court.  It is plausible 
then that the Court’s judges experience a similar kind of acclimation whereby ethno-
nationalism comes to play a greater role in their decision-making over time.  Furthermore, the 
longer a judge serves on a court, the more opportunity she has to learn about the preferences 
and tendencies of other judges (Collins 2008). Thus, a judge who initially makes a 
determined effort to decide cases legalistically (and without regard to ethno-national 
affiliation) may become increasingly jaded as she observes other judges deciding cases along 
clear ethno-national lines.  Consequently, she may become less hesitant to give rein to her 
own biases as her tenure goes on.  In light of these conjectures, we propose to test the 
following hypothesis:  
 
THE ACCLIMATION HYPOTHESIS:  
The propensity to favour co-ethnic petitioners will increase as a judge accumulates years of 
tenure on the Court.  
 
Data and Preliminary Analysis  
Our analysis relies on an original dataset of all non-unanimous abstract review decisions of 
the Constitutional Court terminated on the merits from the beginning of the Court’s work in 
1997 to the end of 2013. The unit of analysis is the individual judge’s ‘vote’ (N=190).  Our 
focus on non-unanimous decisions is based on a well-rehearsed rationale: a dissent is the 
clearest indication that the law at issue in the dispute was sufficiently indeterminate as to 
present the judges with a genuine choice about which way to decide (Pritchett 1948; Tate and 
Sittiwong 1989).32  Our decision to focus on abstract review cases is motivated by two 
considerations.  First, the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis requires that we can reliably code 
for the ethnicity of the claimant in the cases we look at.  Although one might be able to make 
an educated guess at the ethnicity of a claimant on the basis of his or her surname, most of the 
                                                          
32 This is not to say that the outcome in unanimous decisions is a foregone conclusion.  But, 
given the methods we use here, including unanimous decisions would limit the variance that 
can be leveraged to explain individual judicial choice (Tate and Sittiwong 1989: 902; for an 
example of how data on unanimous decisions can be used to study judicial behaviour, see 
Epstein et al 2013).    
Court’s published decisions in appeals and referrals from lower courts use only the parties’ 
initials.  And even where they are given in full, names are not necessarily reliable markers for 
ethno-national affiliation; many surnames are ethnically ambiguous and mixed ethnic 
heritage further complicates coding (even for claimants with names that are recognizably 
Muslim). The advantage then of abstract review cases is that the petitioners are always 
politicians whose ethno-national affiliation is either widely known or discernible from 
publicly available data.  The price we pay for focusing on abstract review decisions is that we 
cannot determine if or how far the effect of ethno-national affiliation extends to the rest of the 
Court’s work (where the issues at stake may well be less ethno-nationally charged and of 
relatively little constitutional consequence).      
With respect to the characteristics of the decisions, our data include the level of 
government under review, the type of legal issue or issues raised in each case,33 as well as the 
ethno-national affiliation and political party of the petitioner(s). With respect to the judges, 
the data include the ethno-national affiliation of each judge, the number of years already 
served in their tenure, the number of years remaining in the judges’ mandates at the time of 
the decision, and the political party (or parties) controlling the relevant entity legislature at 
the time of the judges’ appointment.34  We use dichotomous variables to code the individual 
                                                          
33 If a case relates to more than one distinct piece of legislation or government action, we 
include each as a separate set of observations, provided that the judges are non-unanimous 
with respect to each set.  In other words, only the non-unanimous components of such cases 
are included in the dataset.   
34 Based on what we know about how appointment in the entity legislatures works, we code 
Bosniak judges has having been appointed by the dominant Bosniak party in the FBiH 
legislature at the time of appointment (which in all cases is the SDA) and Croat judges as 
having been appointed by the HDZ, which has always been the dominant Croat party in the 
decision of each judge (coded “1” if they are in the majority finding a constitutional violation 
or, where the majority does not find a violation, if they author a dissent to that effect).  
Summary statistics for all observations are displayed in Table 1.   
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Abstract Review Decisions  
Variable  Mean 
 (N=190) 
Judge votes to find a violation 
 
.342 
Court finds a violation  
 
.411 
 
Ethno-national affiliation of 
petitioner 
- Bosniak petitioner 
- Serb petitioner 
- Croat petitioner 
 
 
.584 
.279 
.137 
 
Case challenges FBiH  
 
.184 
Case challenges RS  
 
.489 
Case challenges BiH  
 
.326 
Bosniak Judge  
 
.226 
Serb Judge  
 
.2 
Croat Judge  
 
.232 
International Judge  
 
.342 
Case raises an ECHR issue  
 
.311 
5-Year Mandate  .5 
 
A preliminary analysis of this data does indeed reveal patterns which suggest that 
ethno-national affiliation influences the Court’s decision-making in abstract review cases.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
FBiH.  We code Serb judges as having been appointed by whichever Serb party controlled 
the RS legislature at the time of appointment.   
Table 2 reports the fraction of judges’ votes finding a constitutional violation by unit of 
government under review.  For ease of comparison, these percentages are graphed in Figure 
1.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Fraction of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review Decisions  
 BiH RS FBiH 
Bosniak judge 2 /14  (.143) 15/21 (.714) 3/8 (.375) 
Serb judge 11/13 (.846) 1/17 (.059) 1/8 (.125) 
Croat judge 5/14  (.357) 7/22 (.318) 1/8 (.125) 
International  judge 
 
1/21  (.048) 12/33 (.364) 6/11 (.545) 
Total  19/62 (.306) 35/93 (.376) 11/35 (.314) 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review Decisions  
 
 
As can be seen, international judges and Bosniak judges almost never vote against a law or 
government action from BiH while Serb judges do so in nearly 87% of observations.  In 
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contrast, in cases involving RS, Serb judges virtually never vote to find a violation (1/17) 
while Bosniak judges do so in about 71% of observations.  With respect to cases involving 
FBiH, international judges find a violation in over 50% of observations, while Serb and Croat 
judges find violations in only about 12% of observations.  These patterns are, broadly 
speaking, consistent with the constitutional preferences espoused by the main ethno-
nationalist parties, as well as the findings of public opinion research on the constitutional 
preferences of each ethno-national group; Bosniaks tend to be centralists, while Croats and 
Serbs tend to be decentralists (Prism Research 2013: 44). In other words, the observed 
patterns of judicial behaviour appear to reflect ethno-national perspectives.  More to the point 
for our purposes here, the data is consistent with the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis. As can 
be seen from Table 3 and Figure 2, in observations from abstract review cases in which the 
judge and petitioner(s) are not co-ethnics, only about 23% of votes (34 out 147) find a 
constitutional violation. In contrast, where the judge and (at least one) petitioner are co-
ethnics, 72% of votes (31/43) find a constitutional violation.  Furthermore, and consistent 
with the Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis, the tendency to find a constitutional violation where 
the judge and (at least one) petitioner are co-ethnics is slightly higher (roughly 77%, or 
17/22) for observations from the 5-year mandate than it is for observations from the long-
term mandate (about 67%, or 14/21).   
Table 3. Fraction of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review Decisions  
 All Observations Short-Term Mandate Long-Term Mandate 
Non Co-Ethnic 
Petitioner 
 
34/147 (.23) 18/73 (.25)  16/74 (.22) 
Co-ethnic Petitioner 31/43 (.72) 
 
17/22 (.77) 14/21 (.67) 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Votes for a Constitutional Violation in Abstract Review Decisions  
 The above-noted patterns in the decision-making of the individual justices have 
important consequences for the aggregate outcomes of the Court’s decisions.  Taking into 
account both unanimous and non-unanimous decisions, abstract review challenges to the RS 
and FBiH entities have a successes rate of 47.6% and 50% respectively.  In contrast, 
challenges to the BiH level only succeed in 26.3% of cases. Bosniak petitioners are also the 
most successful challengers, bringing 29 of 67 (or 43.5%) of the abstract review challenges 
and winning in 15 (or 51.7%) of these. In contrast, Serb petitioners brought 31 of these 
challenges, of which they won only 6 (or 19.4%), while Croats brought only 7 challenges, 
winning in only 3 (or 42.9%) of them.  In short, the Court’s output would seem to favour 
Bosniak constitutional preferences, upholding central state laws in the vast majority of cases 
but regularly disciplining the entities.  
As suggestive as this preliminary analysis might be, it only provides cursory evidence 
of the effects of ethno-nationalism and judicial tenure on judicial behaviour.  In what follows, 
we test our hypotheses against the data in a more rigorous and nuanced way.  
 
Testing the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis  
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
All Observations
Short-Term
Long-Term
Not Co-ethnic
Co-ethnic
To test the Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis, we estimate logit regression models with 
standard errors clustered by judge.35 The dependent variable is the judge’s ‘vote’, coded “1” 
to find a constitutional violation and “0” if otherwise.  The main independent variable of 
interest is a dummy variable, coded “1” if at least one of the abstract review petitioners and 
the judge are co-ethnics.36   
Our models include several controls for potential confounding variables. Arguably the 
most important of these is a variable to control for alignment between the judges’ appointing 
political party and the petitioners’ political party.  The Co-Ethnic Petitioner Hypothesis is 
motivated by the theory that the judges will favour co-ethnic elites because they share the 
same ethno-nationalist policy preferences and/or because of in-group favouritism.  But ethno-
nationalist politics and ethnicity are likely to be highly correlated with party political 
affiliation in a divided society.  Thus, a tendency to favour co-ethnic challengers may be 
partly (or even entirely) a function of political partisanship. Indeed, party-political loyalty has 
been found to be a strong predictor of judicial behaviour on other apex courts (see for 
example Garoupa et al 2013; and Hönnige 2009).  Thus, we include a dummy variable to 
control for the possibility that the domestic judges may be more likely, other things being 
equal, to support challenges brought by the political party that appointed them.  Including this 
                                                          
35 In so far as the same judges feature in the dataset across numerous observations, “naïve” 
standard errors may under-or over-estimate the significance of certain judge-specific effects 
(for sophisticated discussion of the pros and cons of using clustered standard errors, see Zorn 
2006). 
36 Some abstract review cases are brought by a group of petitioners representing more than 
one ethno-national community. For example, a petition may be brought by a group of Serbs 
and Croat politicians, in which case the co-ethnic petitioner variable will take the value of “1” 
for both the Serb and Croat judges deciding that case.    
variable comes at some cost – we are forced to drop nine observations (i.e. one case) in which 
the party of the petitioners could not be confidently determined.  It should also be noted that 
in all challenges by brought by Croats, the petitioners belonged to the same party as the party 
that appointed the Croat judges (i.e. HDZ).  Accordingly, we cannot confidently distinguish 
between the effects of party-political loyalty and ethno-national affiliation with respect to 
Croat judges. Naturally, we also include categorical variables to control for the ethno-national 
affiliation of the judge (using the international judges as the reference category) and the 
petitioner (using Croat judges as the reference category). The rationale here is that, all else 
equal, some groups may be more prone to bringing relatively more spurious constitutional 
challenge and some groups of judges may be relatively more restrained (or “activist”) than 
others.  Indeed, these control variables are essential; the main independent variable of interest 
– ethnic alignment between the judge and petitioner – is effectively a product of them.        
In addition to the above, we include several ancillary control variables.  We use a 
categorical variable to control for the unit of government whose law or action is being 
challenged (using the BiH state level as the reference category); it is possible that some units 
of government, particularly RS, may be more constitutionally “rebellious” than others.  In 
addition, we use a dummy variable to control for the influence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).  The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina incorporates the ECHR, 
making it directly enforceable and superior to all ordinary domestic law;37 it is conceivable 
that, all else equal, judges may be more likely to find a constitutional violation in cases where 
they can appeal to the external authority of the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  Finally, we use a dummy variable to control for whether or not the 
case was decided during the initial 5-year short-term mandate. The rationale here is that the 
political context during those first five years may have been more or less prone to meritorious 
                                                          
37 Art.II.II. 
challenges or relatively more or less “activist” judgments (although we have no theoretical 
expectation either way).     
The first of our models tests the general effect of a co-ethnic petitioner on the 
probability of a judge finding a constitutional violation.  Models 2 uses interaction terms to 
test if the effect is significant for both Bosniak and Serb judges taken separately (for the 
reasons noted above, we do not do the same for Croat judges).  Model 3 replaces the party-
political alignment variable with a control variable that roughly tracks ideological proximity 
between the petitioner’s party and the judge’s appointing party (coded “1” if both are 
generally right of centre or both are generally left of centre).  Admittedly, this is a rather 
blunt proxy for ideological affinity.  But if we assume that the political parties appoint judges 
who are ideologically proximate to them, Model 3 should give us some sense of the relative 
strength of more traditional (i.e. non-nationalist) left-right attitudinal influences (we restrict 
observations to just the domestic judges in Model 3 because we do not presently have any 
way to code the probable ideological leanings of the international judges).  
 
Table 4.  Logit Regressions for Finding a Constitutional Violation in Non-Unanimous Decisions  
Robust standard errors (clustered by judge) in parentheses; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3  
Petitioner is co-ethnic of judge 3.786** 
(.856) 
- 4.1* 
1.771 
Petitioner is from judge’s appointing 
political party  
-1.074 
(.733) 
.41 
(.684) 
- 
Petitioner and judge’s appointing 
party are ideologically proximate  
-  -  .0737 
(.585) 
Bosniak judge -1.187 
(.791) 
-.948 
(.674) 
-1.99 
(1.74) 
Bosniak petitioner  .716 
(1.447) 
.191 
(1.619) 
.0232 
(2.12) 
Bosniak judge*Bosniak petitioner - 2.211* 
(.942) 
- 
Serb judge -.737 
(.384) 
-1.017** 
(.381) 
-  
Serb petitioner  -2.08** 
(.684) 
-3.3** 
(1.178) 
-3.363 
(2.02) 
Serb judge*Serb petitioner   
- 
4.691** 
(1.786) 
- 
Croat judge  -.387 
(.521) 
- - 
Challenge to FBiH Law or Gov’t 
Action 
-.776 
1.356 
-.696 
(1.62) 
-2.52 
(1.64) 
Challenge to RS Law or Gov’t 
Action 
-1.305 
1.396 
-1.218 
(1.68) 
-2.4     
(1.828) 
The case raises an ECHR Issue -.146 
.507 
-.262 
(.506) 
.022   
 (.763) 
Case is from short-term mandate  .182 
(.372) 
.107 
(.374) 
-.213 
(.44) 
Constant .544 
1.432 
.285 
(.739) 
1.287  
 1.915 
Log pseudolikelihood = 
Pseudo R2 = 
Wald chi2(9) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
Number of obs = 
-92.480 
0.209 
91.80 
0.0000 
181 
-93.038 
0.205 
137.31 
0.0000 
181 
-54.571 
0.336 
74.89 
0.0000 
125 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, the results provide robust support for the Co-Ethnic Petitioner 
Hypothesis. Model 1 shows that an alignment of ethnicity between the petitioner and the 
judge significantly increases the likelihood of finding a violation, even when controlling for 
the influence of party-political appointment. The difference in predicted probabilities for 
finding a constitutional violation in these cases is also a substantively meaningful one.  All 
else being equal, the probability of a judge finding a constitutional violation in abstract 
review cases is only .20 [.15, .26], but it rises to .84 [.74, .94] when the judge and petitioner 
are co-ethnics.   Robustness tests on subsets of the data show that this effect is significant 
(and comparable) for all three groups of domestic judges: the average marginal effect (or 
“AME”) of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of finding a constitutional violation is .63 
[.49, .78] for Bosniak judges; .64 [.49, .78] for Serb judges, and .67 [.52, .82] for Croat 
judges.38   Model 2 provides additional confirmation that the effect in question is significant 
for both Bosniak and Serb judges (the interaction terms with the ethnicity of the challenger 
are both positive and statistically significant)  and Model 3 shows that the effect of a co-
ethnic petitioner remains significant when controlling for left-right ideological proximity 
                                                          
38 We use Stata’s “subpop” command to calculate these AMEs.  
between the petitioner and the judge (indeed, putative left-right ideological proximity seems 
to make virtually no difference).  Across all three models, the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner 
is robust to alternate specifications that drop the ancillary control variables (i.e. unit of 
government being challenged, the mandate, and the presence of an ECHR issue).    
 
Testing the Tenure Hypotheses  
To test the tenure hypotheses, we ran variations of Model 1, but with interaction terms 
relating to the judge’s tenure on the court.39 In Model 4, we test for a simple interaction 
between short-term tenure and the effects of a co-ethnic petitioner; if the Short-Term Tenure 
Hypothesis is correct, the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner should be enhanced by short-term 
mandates.40 This approach does not account for the fact that the long-term tenured judges 
were appointed at various ages and so the length of their mandates, i.e. the number of years 
between their appointment and mandatory retirement at age 70, also varies.  It is plausible 
that there may be little practical difference between the behaviour of a judge appointed for a 
5-year term at the age of 55 and a judge appointed at the age of 65 with mandatory at age 70.  
Accordingly, in Model 5, we use an interaction term for (the natural log of) the length of the 
judge’s tenure, i.e. the number of years from the time of her appointment to the expiry of her 
                                                          
39 Our methodology for interaction effects in the following analysis closely follows the 
advice of Brambor et al (2006). 
40 Because two of the short-term domestic judges in our dataset, Judge Marko Arsović, (a 
Serb) and Judge Mirko Zovko (a Croat), were already over the age of 60 at the time of 
appointment they might, arguably, be less affected by post-appointment pressures and 
incentives.  Accordingly, we ran an alternate specification of Model 4 in which we exclude 
observations of these judges. 
mandate. The idea here is to determine if, regardless of the formal tenure category, the effect 
of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour is amplified by relatively shorter terms.  
Finally, Model 6 tests the Acclimation Hypothesis by including an interaction term for the 
(natural log) of the number of years of tenure accumulated at the time of the judge’s decision.  
If the Acclimation Hypothesis is correct, the effect of ethno-national affiliation should be 
amplified as years of accumulated tenure increase.  The results for these models are reported 
in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Logit Regressions for Interaction Effects of Ethno-national Affiliation with Tenure  
Robust standard errors clustered by judge in parentheses; * p< 0.05; ** p< 0.01 
 Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Petitioner is co-ethnic of judge 2.635* 
(.791) 
2.44  
(1.363) 
1.465 
(1.22) 
Judge has short-term mandate 
 
.278 
(.416) 
-  - 
Length of judge’s mandate  
 
 -.147 
(.28) 
- 
Accumulated tenure at time of decision  -  - -.457 
(.420) 
Co-ethnic petitioner*short-term 
mandate 
.211 
(.738) 
- - 
Co-ethnic petitioner*length of judge’s 
mandate  
-  .079 
(.508)  
-  
Co-ethnic petitioner*accumulated 
tenure 
-   .829 
(.715) 
Petitioner is from judge’s appointing 
political party  
-.228 
(.775) 
-.076 
.784 
-.126 
(.828) 
Bosniak judge -.907 
(.655) 
-.909  
(.637) 
-.956 
(.607) 
Serb judge -.851* 
(.416) 
-.873*  
(.443) 
-.999 
(.523) 
Croat judge 
 
-.376 
(.450) 
-.364  
(.437) 
-.375 
(.447) 
Challenge to FBiH Law or Gov’t 
Action 
-.027 
(.719) 
-.025 
(.716) 
-.085 
(.708) 
Challenge to RS Law or Gov’t Action .190 
(.474) 
.173  
.(48) 
.138 
(.49) 
The case raises an ECHR Issue 
 
-.458 
(.415) 
-.483 
(.415) 
-.493 
(.423) 
Constant 
 
-.918 
(.464) 
-.443 
(.743) 
.008 
(.813) 
Log pseudolikelihood =  
Pseudo R2 =  
Wald chi2(9) =  
Prob > chi2 =  
Number of obs =  
-99.159 
0.152 
85.95 
0.000 
181 
-99.472 
0.15 
68.12 
0.000 
181 
-98.842 
0.155 
53.67 
0.0000 
181 
 
 
 
 
 
As the results for Model 4 illustrate, contrary to the predictions of the Short-Term 
Tenure Hypothesis, short-term tenure per se does not seem to significantly amplify the 
tendency to side with a co-ethnic petitioner (see Table 5).  The coefficient for the relevant 
interaction term is not significant.  And although the predicted probability of a judge finding 
a constitutional violation in cases of a co-ethnic petitioner is somewhat higher for short-term 
tenured judges (.83 [.65, 1.0]) then it is for long-term appointed judges (.75 [.54, .96]), the 
AME of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of finding a constitutional violation does not 
differ significantly as between long-term and short-term tenured judges.  For the former, the 
AME of a co-ethnic petitioner is .55 [.31, .80], while for the latter it is .58 [.34, .82].  The 
estimated “contrast” between these two marginal effects is only 0.03 [-.20, .27], a difference 
which is clearly not significant.41   
The results of Model 5, where we substitute the formal tenure category for number of 
years in the judge’s term, also fail to support the Short-Term Tenure Hypothesis.  In this case, 
                                                          
41 These results are robust to an alternate specification of Model 4 that excludes those short-
term appointed judges who were appointed over the age of 60.  In fact, with this specification 
the marginal effects of a co-ethnic petitioner for both long-term tenured and short-term 
tenured judges are virtually identical; the AME is .55 [.31, .79] for the former and .55 [.29, 
.81] for the latter. 
that the coefficient of the interaction term here is insignificant is not, all on its own, hard 
evidence against the hypothesis.  The coefficient of an interaction term XZ only reflects the 
effect of X on Y when both X and Z are greater than zero. Thus, where Z is a continuous 
variable, “it is perfectly possible for the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for 
substantively relevant values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the 
interaction term is insignificant” (Brambor et al 2006: 74; see also Berry et al 2010).  
Accordingly, to determine if there is a significant interaction between X and Z, one needs to 
look beyond the coefficients and calculate the marginal effects of X for meaningful values of 
Z (Brambor et al 2006).  In light of these considerations, we estimate and plot the AME of a 
co-ethnic petitioner across the spectrum of observed values for term length.  As Figure 3 
shows, the effect of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of finding a constitutional 
violation is significant and virtually static across this entire range and so it seems then that the 
length of a judge’s tenure does not enhance (or diminish) the effect.  
Figure 3.  
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 Turning now to Model 6, where we test the Acclimation Hypothesis, we do find some 
affirmative evidence.   Again the interaction term is insignificant. However, because the 
conditioning variable here is continuous, we follow the same procedure as above and 
calculate and the AMEs of a co-ethnic petitioner across the range of observed values for 
accumulated tenure at the time of the judges’ decisions.  This time the plot does suggest a 
positive interaction (see Figure 4).  The effect of a co-ethnic petitioner on the probability of 
finding a constitutional violation is significant at all but the lowest two values in this range 
and, as the Acclimation Hypothesis predicts, this effect increases with years of accumulated 
tenure.  In other words, the effect of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour appears 
to be enhanced by time served on the court.   
Figure 4.  
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Before discussing the importance of these findings, a few caveats are warranted.  First of all, 
as we noted earlier, our data relates only to abstract review cases and so we cannot generalize 
here about the influence of ethno-national affiliation across the Court’s entire caseload.  
Abstract review challenges make up about 20% of the cases decided in the period we 
consider and these cases are inherently political and ethno-nationally charged (they are 
initiated by politicians mobilized along ethno-national lines).   Thus, a finding of ethno-
national bias in abstract review cases does not necessarily tell us anything about the judges’ 
behaviour in appeals or referrals from lower courts.  It is certainly plausible that these other 
aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction, in so far as they may be more concerned with individual 
claims of right than ethno-national politics, are relatively unaffected by the influence of 
ethno-national affiliation.  Indeed, had we been able to reliably code the ethnicity of 
claimants in these other cases, we might have been able to determine whether the observed 
influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour is driven by ethno-nationalist 
political preferences or simple inter-group biases - a finding that ethno-national affiliation is 
not a significant predictor of judicial behaviour in these other cases, where big constitutional 
controversies are not the norm, would suggest that the influence we observe in the abstract 
review cases is truly attitudinal and not merely a consequence of in-group favouritism.  
Future research (we hope) may yet find a way to surmount the coding challenge we faced.  
Second, despite their political nature, most of the Court’s abstract review decisions decided 
during the period we consider are unanimous (roughly 66%).  This much suggests that, in the 
bulk of the Court’s work, other factors (e.g. legal reasoning, dissent aversion) are more 
influential than ethno-national affiliation with respect to how the judges vote.  Finally, our 
dataset – though inclusive of all non-unanimous abstract review decisions from 1997 to the 
end of 2013 – is ultimately only a sample from a particular slice of history.  What is true of 
these judges’ during this period of time may not be true of the same or future judges in the 
future. 
These caveats aside, the evidence considered here strongly suggests that ethno-
national affiliation exerts a significant influence on the Court in non-unanimous abstract 
review decisions.  When the judges do disagree, ethno-national affiliation is a powerful 
predictor of how they divide and this influence cannot be reduced to simple party-political 
loyalty. Moreover, the influence of ethno-national affiliation appears to be unaffected by the 
length of the judges’ mandates; long-term appointed judges do not categorically differ from 
their short-term counterparts in their propensity to decide cases along ethno-national lines. In 
fact, consistent with an “acclimation effect”, ethno-national biases appear to be amplified by 
the experience of sitting on an apex court in a deeply divided society.    
These findings cut against a strategic explanation. As we noted earlier, Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s fragmented and decentralized system insulates the Court from direct court 
curbing. Thus, the apparent influence of ethno-national affiliation is probably not a function 
of a strategic response to direct threats against the Court as an institution. To be sure, we 
cannot completely dismiss the explanation that the judges are strategically motivated by 
personal incentives or pressures to side with co-ethnics. However, the fact that the short-term 
appointed judges are no less prone to side with co-ethnic petitioners, even though they would 
have relatively greater careerist incentives to do so, strongly suggests that the observed 
patterns really do reflect sincere political preferences and/or inter-group biases.  In other 
words, the problem appears to be a lack of impartiality (as opposed to independence).   
Our findings also have some important implications for the study of courts more 
generally.  Our analysis demonstrates that the attitudinal model can be modified and extended 
to study the influence of group-based identity politics on judicial behaviour.  In many 
societies, this kind of politics is more salient than left-right ideological cleavages.  Although 
we have not controlled for the full range of rival hypotheses that are relevant to the attitudinal 
model, our findings provide some preliminary support for the claim that ethno-nationalist 
attitudinal influences are distinct from - and perhaps more powerful than - left-right 
attitudinal influences. We hope that further studies will incorporate a similar approach in 
advancing the study of judicial behaviour in non-US contexts. Our findings also suggest that 
the phenomenon of acclimation effects, previously observed in the US, may be broadly 
generalizable to other contexts.   And if this is so – if accumulated tenure tends to enhance 
attitudinal bias – longer judicial mandates may not be the optimal design choice for 
constitutional courts in divided societies.  
Some might argue that the influence of ethno-national affiliation on judicial behaviour 
is really not such a grave problem.  After all, the US Supreme Court enjoys a comparatively 
high degree of diffuse public support, despite the fact that its decision-making is popularly 
perceived to be influenced by the justices’ personal ideology and values (Gibson & Caldeira 
2011).  However, as Gibson and Caldeira observe, this popular perception of the US Supreme 
Court coexists with the view that the justices are nevertheless “principled” decision-makers 
and not mere “politicians in robes” (2011:214). Although there is yet to be any comparable 
empirical research on the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
decision-making patterns we have observed here are arguably less compatible with diffuse 
public support, at least in a deeply divided and post-conflict society. The Court exists in a 
context very unlike the American one; there is no long-standing tradition of the rule of law 
and the legitimacy of the Constitution is itself widely contested along ethno-national lines. 
The negotiators of the Bosnian Constitution may well have anticipated (and even hoped) that 
the domestic judges would tend to represent their respective ethno-national blocs; the 
inclusion of international judges as a putative balancing force on the Court would seem to 
suggest as much. However, once it becomes apparent that one community’s constitutional 
preferences tend to benefit from this arrangement, the notion that the international judges are 
somehow neutral is probably not much consolation to those on the losing side. It is perhaps 
not surprising then that the Court has had the significant compliance problems we have noted 
here.  Such problems are not necessarily caused by a legitimacy deficit, but the perceived 
ethno-national partiality of the judges provides easy ammunition for those who would seek to 
shirk compliance with particular decisions or undermine the Court’s authority more 
generally.  
The question then is what, if anything, can be done to ameliorate this kind of problem.  
It is tempting, perhaps, to conclude that judicial impartiality in a deeply divided society is an 
absurd ideal.  In such contexts, regardless of the appointment mechanism, judges are likely to 
be ethnically or ethno-nationally impartial for the simple reason that most people are 
ethnically or ethno-nationally impartial.  Indeed, even an ostensibly apolitical appointment 
system can be captured by ethnic or ethno-national politics but there are some institutional 
reforms that might at least mitigate these hazards.  Strict selection criteria for judicial office 
might limit the ability of political elites to pack a court with reliable allies. This does not 
guarantee that ethno-nationalist judges will not be appointed regardless, but it might help 
more impartial judges to win the selection contest more often.  Reforms to legal education or 
judicial training might also be directed towards more integrated professional socialization in 
the hope that this would soften ethnocentric perspectives.  Furthermore, as our findings here 
suggest, relatively shorter judicial mandates may actually be preferable to long-term tenure; if 
the influence of ethno-nationalism tends to grow with time, it may be better not to leave 
judges on the court for longer than is needed to secure their independence from the influence 
of post-appointment career pressures.  Thus, in the case of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, 
appointments to the Court might be restricted to those who are already in their sixties, while 
still requiring retirement at age seventy. In this way, the problem of acclimation effects (if 
they do indeed exist) and the potential influence of post-tenure careerist pressures (if any) 
could both be addressed; judges would serve shorter-terms before retiring at an age after 
which they would have minimal post-appointment career prospects.  Finally, the publication 
of dissents could be prohibited, as it is in several European constitutional courts (Kelemen 
2013).   Although this prohibition would inhibit the ability of people like us to study the 
judges’ behaviour, a single institutional voice, uncomplicated by conspicuous ethno-national 
discord, might enhance a court’s authority. These are just a few speculative proposals.  
Further research on the effects of judicial selection and tenure in other divided societies is 
needed to determine if these or other prescriptions are prudent and generalizable.    
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